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The U.S.-China confrontation has become white-hot in recent years. The United States has created most of the causes, and most of its tensions are also caused by the U.S. But the U.S. policy toward China is persistently wrong. China is not a warmonger. The US anti-China policy is entirely based on its misjudgment of China. The author believes that the U.S. has made the following six major misjudgments about China, which will have terrible consequences. (See Part I and II)
 
1. The influence of Chinese history

The United States is a young great power, with a history of only 250 years. It was founded at the right time and place, and it did not go through great hardships. On the contrary, because it is in North America, far away from the Eurasian wars, it played a leading role in both world wars without much sacrifice. By taking advantage of its remote location and delayed participation, the U.S. was able to make war profits and gain the status of a victor without bringing the war to its turf causing damages. Thus the U.S. is relatively short-sighted and biased about history, which can be seen in its national education, light on Asia’s five thousand years of history, especially China, nearly ignored. It also often implements its foreign policy with the posture and mentality of the modern Western colonial empire. The relationship between the U.S. and China began just as the Manchu Qing Dynasty in China was weakening. The Chinese National Revolution had a treacherous path. The country struggled for nearly thirty years to establish a republic nation while the Western imperial powers were occupying China's cities and ports. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, there was still a civil war lasting nearly one hundred years dividing China across the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. does not understand nor appreciate China's history and its glorious achievements in the past (leading power in the world), and it only regards China as a backward undeveloped, or developing country based on its weakest national condition (enduring foreign invasions while transforming from a dynasty to a republic nation). This misjudgment led to the U.S.-China policy that first practiced interfering with other countries’ (weak governments) policies using US military and economic power and then focused on maintaining US hegemony to prevent the rise of other countries (e.g. Japan, Germany, Russia, and China today). Now the U.S.-China relations have developed into an unfavorable situation. Misjudgment of China's historical influence is a major reason.

2. Variability of the Communist Party of China

The US anti-communist strategy began before World War II and has lasted nearly a hundred years. It regards all communist countries led by Soviet Russia as invariable enemy countries. The Soviet Socialist Republic established by the Communist Party of Soviet Russia did have attempts to expand worldwide. However, the Communist Party of China founded the party based on Marxism only to awaken the Chinese people to overthrow the corrupt Manchu Empire. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a new independent party and has a strong history of its revolution movement and its evolution. It did not blindly join the Soviet Communist Union. This can be seen in its clear break with the Soviet Republic in the 1960s. There are mistakes and successes in the evolution of the CCP, but it is undeniable that the CCP is by no means an immutable or invariant political party. Its early experiments, the subsequent efforts to keep a low profile to learn (crossing the river carefully by feeling the stones), and the current reforms and innovations (rapid modernization on its own) are all proof that the CCP has been changing and progressing. The U.S. only remembers the tenacity of the Chinese Communist Army in the Korean War. It is a serious misjudgment to regard the CCP as an unchanging Soviet-style Communist Party. It failed to appreciate and approve the CCP's achievements in poverty alleviation, economic and infrastructure development, education elevation in science and technology, and strengthening the military for national defense, so after crushing the Soviets, the U.S. pointed the finger at China unwisely.
 
3. The purpose of China’s rise

China's rapid rise naturally has many basic factors. Looking back and analyzing, it is not difficult to understand some of the characteristics of the Chinese people, the influence of Chinese history, the organizational capabilities of the Communist Party of China, and the favorable international situation at the right time and right place, which allow China the opportunity to rise with outstanding performance in all aspects of economic development. But the main purpose of China's rise is to let the people live a better life. This purpose is also the driving force behind China's success. China is not rising to pursue hegemony nor to rival the U.S. for hegemony as wrongly judged by many American 'elites'. China's military development is obviously for defense (against an island-chain containment strategy) rather than for offensive aggression. This misjudgment has also seriously contributed to the deterioration of Sino-US relations today. The U.S. has adopted all-out measures to resist and suppress China’s continued development. These misjudgments which produced wrong strategies and policies not only failed to stop China's rise but instead made the Chinese people resentful (changing from admiring Americans). Why can't the Chinese people have the goal of living a better life? The resilience and hard-working spirit of the Chinese people coupled with the success of China’s public education effort will enable China to continue to develop, no one can stop them. Why should the U.S. be so afraid of competition?
 
4. China’s future development potential

China is a solid big country with sustainable economic power. Its 1.4 billion people are not only the world's largest productive force, but also the world's largest consumer market. This is because, in the process of economic development, it started by promoting a labor-intensive low-end manufacturing industry with inexpensive labor, used its giant market to absorb foreign investment and technology to upgrade its industries, and used the education system to support industrial demand, so it could gradually improve its economic development with its periodic five-year development plans. Progress and success are seen in the strength of science and technology and industrial manufacturing even in space exploration (six times to the Moon).

(To be continued in Part II)
  
 

 
The U.S. has become the sole superpower since it won the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. has the strongest military power with hundreds of military bases all over the world. Its intelligence organization led by the Central Intelligence Agency operates everywhere.  Of course, the U.S. dollar being the principal world trading currency has a pivotal influence on the world’s finance and economy. However, entering the twenty-first century, terrorism surfaced which had an impact on the U.S. Relatively, many countries had developed their economies at a faster rate than that of the U.S. On the world scale, the U.S. economy decreased from above one-third of the world economy to below one-fifth, measured in terms of the world GDP. Most notably, as a surprise, China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010. Today, China is still growing at a fast rate approaching the economic size of the U.S. in any coming year soon.
 
With all the strength the U.S. possesses, why is the U.S. surprised that China as the most populated nation will rise someday? The U.S. national strategy has been aggressive, a hegemony strategy: Watch out for competitors and suppress them before they rise. But China survived and rose by applying its anti-hegemony strategy: A low-key manner of fending itself and working extremely hard in economic development. Although the U.S. succeeded in suppressing Germany and Japan and collapsing the Soviet Union, it failed with its hegemony strategy against anti-hegemony. Hegemony requires resources to project to the entire world, yet anti-hegemony only needs to defend oneself against the hegemon. Therefore, the U.S. as a superpower is caught by surprise by the rapid rise of China. Currently, U.S.-China relations are at their lowest point with a danger of erupting into a military confrontation. Can the U.S. continue with its hegemony strategy against China? Can the U.S. handle the surprises in the future?
 
In this article, we will first discuss and understand the surprises caused by the U.S.-China confrontation. Then we may address whether the U.S. should reconsider its assumptions and strategy. At present time the following events have certainly brought surprises and challenges to the U.S.:

1. Though the Russian-Ukraine war was not a surprise to the U.S., the U.S. did not seem to have a solution for managing or ending it before encouraging NATO and the EU to support Ukraine and escalate the war. The fighting has been over two years now with a devastating impact on Ukrainians and Russian military forces as well. The surprise came in February of 2023 when China made a 12-point peace proposal to bring the two parties to a ceasefire and negotiation. It is a good plan with good intentions from a neutral party. Now the U.S. needs to handle this surprise. Hopefully, Blinken’s effort to make a China trip will produce a workable solution together with China. After all, a ceasefire is always better than a continuous battle that not only kills many lives but also damages the world economy.
2.  With China’s mediation and years of quiet effort, it was a big surprise that Saudi Arabia and Iran re-established diplomatic relations. The two countries signed the accord in Beijing last year. This is a history-changing surprise not only affecting the Middle East and Middle Asia politics and economies but also enhancing world peace. Can the U.S. (with or without Israel) handle this surprise? Should the U.S. revise its Middle East foreign policy to work with China? A further surprise is coming, that is, the formation of the Persian Gulf Navy Alliance among the eight Arab nations. Should the U.S. and Israel take a confrontational approach or adopt a peaceful co-existence plan?  
3. Last September during the Russian-Ukraine war, there was a bombing of the Nord Stream gas pipeline which had a devastating impact on Europeans' lives. This June, the Ukraine Kakhovka Dam controlled by the Russian military in Ukraine was again bombed causing many deaths and property loss. Who has done these terrorist acts? How would these bombings be investigated? Can the U.S. handle these surprises and future findings? Should the U.S. continue pushing the expansion of NATO into Asia while the EU has second thoughts about supporting the Ukraine war? Can the U.S. handle the changing hearts of Micron in France and Shultz in Germany regarding the U.S.’s China policy?
4.  The U.S.’s current foreign policy seems to target Russia and China at the same time which is making Sino-Russia relation getting closer. After the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, it is obvious that Russia needs China as a trading partner while being sanctioned by the U.S. and EU. Although China never wanted to form military alliances (an anti-hegemony strategy), the U.S. military alliance and their exercises in the China Seas pushed China and Russia to increase their joint military exercises. Can the U.S. handle this Sino-Russia pseudo-alliance? Will letting Japan expand its military strength be a smart strategy or a sinister plot likely leading to a nuclear WW III?  
5. France and Germany have learned enough lessons from the Russian-Ukraine War that the U.S. may not always have a good intention or solution for the EU. Hence, it should not be a big surprise that France and Germany would adopt their own China policy, as shown by their visits to China with a huge business delegation, clearly, at the minimum, they are separating politics from economics. Can the U.S. handle this new development that comes so soon before the Russian-Ukraine war is over? Should the U.S. also rethink its China policy?

 
In analyzing international relations, one should always follow causality principles. However, due to secrecy in diplomacy, one cannot always see the causal correlations before the affairs are over, sometimes decades or even centuries later. The above-cited surprises may have been a premeditated plan, but their developments can add twists and turns producing surprise elements. One can only collect the known facts and diagnose the situation. At this point, judging by the busy itinerary of Biden’s cabinet officers, many eager to have a dialogue with China or better yet visit China, the U.S. hegemony strategy is not working well against China’s anti-hegemony plan. The U.S. must reflect on its foreign policies, for example, the Middle East policy, and how it failed under its hegemony approach. China, on the other hand, is succeeding with its anti-hegemony strategy, not only in the Middle East but also in other parts of the world such as the African Continent and among island countries. The flip-over of Honduras last year, severing its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and recognizing Mainland China, is another surprise to the U.S. But it was inevitable if analyzed from Honduras' economic needs. Thus, it seems apparent that the U.S. needs to reevaluate its fundamental assumptions about China (and anti-hegemony) from an economic point of view rather than persistently adheres to a 'fake' national security argument (hegemony theory). Is the U.S. facing more threats than all other countries in the world?!

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The author has introduced the term, anti-hegemony in 2022 and 2023 in several essays and a book, Hegemony and Anti-hegemony and U.S.-China Relations, to characterize China in contrast to the U.S. hegemony behavior. Although the concept of anti-hegemony was introduced, the description of anti-hegemony behavior given the current U.S.-China confrontation needs more clarification. Usually, China’s diplomatic behavior in the past is mostly reactionary to the U.S. diplomatic actions. Hence, to have a clear understanding of anti-hegemony (and China’s reactionary diplomatic behavior), one must first have a complete understanding and characterization of the U.S. diplomatic behavior (as a hegemon) which enhances China’s anti-hegemony reactions.
 
There are many senior distinguished American scholars such as R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor, John Mearsheimer (1947), of Chicago University, University Professor Jeffrey Sachs (1954) of Columbia University, G. John Ikenberry (1954), the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Christopher Layne (1949), Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, have devoted considerable scholarly effort to hegemony theory in their field of studies on international relations. Prof. Layne in a review essay, The Waning of U. S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? (JSTOR.org 2009) discussed the post-Cold War unipolar world and the coming multi-polar system in the context of U.S. hegemony and its consequences.
 
Yet the U.S. hegemony behavior continues as reviewed by younger scholars, for example, Salvatore Babones (Born 1969, PhD 2003 John Hopkins University) at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, Australia, an associate professor at the University of Sydney. He published an essay in The National Interest (2015): American Hegemony Is Here to Stay, concluding that the passing of U.S. hegemony is greatly exaggerated. Is this still true, today? On May 31st, 2023, Foreign Policy published an eye-popping paper, ‘Stop Worrying About Chinese Hegemony in Asia - - U.S. fears are not only irrational - - they’re a potential self-fulfilling prophecy, authored by Stephen Martin Walt (1955), the Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International relations at the Harvard Kennedy School at Harvard University. Professor Wait is a political scientist and a member of the realist school of international relations; no doubt, this essay appearing in Foreign Policy, will have a significant impact.
 
Unfortunately, Prof. Wait’s paper is based on a wrong assumption (from this author’s view: China is an anti-hegemony, not a hegemony nation). Prof. Wait’s essay also carried out a faulty analysis (The success of U.S. hegemony and the rise of China are incorrectly analyzed). Most seriously, Prof. Wait’s paper ended with a dangerous conclusion. This author will argue that the U.S. must understand China’s rise under the concept of anti-hegemony, the more the U.S. practices hegemony the more China will succeed with anti-hegemony, fulfilling the U.S. fear. In the following, the above argument will be explained with specifics.
 
Prof Wait claims, “The U.S. and its Asian partners want to maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, ostensibly to prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon there. They worry that Beijing will gradually persuade its neighbors to distance themselves from the U.S.” The Asian nations do not want to see a U.S.-China confrontation forcing them to take sides. The more the U.S. applies hegemony actions, the more China will use anti-hegemony reactions which include rational and realistic ways to bind its neighbors and make them distance from the U.S. hegemony behavior. Prof. Wait had a wrong understanding of Ming history and the causality of Ming’s tribute states. China’s approach in the South China Sea (SCS) to develop SCS residents’ rule of conduct agreement and co-development opportunities is anti-hegemony diplomacy whereas the U.S.’s freedom of navigation and military exercises with allies are hegemony actions only creating more successful anti-hegemony strategy practiced by China.
 
China never started with any ‘expelling the U.S.’ strategy but acted more reactionary to U.S. hegemony behavior. The fact that the U.S. failed to be a hegemon in Asia-Pacific, Middle East or mid-Asia should not and could not be extrapolated to China wanting to emulate the U.S. (and ultimately fail) as a hegemon. The U.S. must understand that China does not want to be a hegemon (like the U.S. desires to practice hegemony behavior) as evidenced by its effort in making peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran or assisting mid-Asian states to have access to the world economy. Sure, China will have more influence in the world, but that is the result of her anti-hegemony behavior, not hegemony actions. The U.S. must understand their differences and consequences.
 
Prof. Wait feels that hegemony is desirable and, therefore, assumes that China will pursue that route. This is wrong. A great nation that desires and enjoys its influence and power on the world stage cannot rely on hegemony behavior supported by the military (Prof. Wait cited historical evidence himself.). Military bases are costly to maintain as evidenced by the U.S. military budget problems and the need to increase allies’ defense share. China does feel insecure in its region. But China does not take a hegemony approach because it prefers peace and its history proves that security and co-prosperity are achievable through an anti-hegemony strategy, which only requires the ability to prevent any state from taking a hegemony action against her. This is precisely the anti-hegemony theory China is practicing.
 
We can summarize the main theme of Prof. Wait’s essay as follows: Hegemon is desirable with political and economic benefits and the U.S. is fortunate to have benefitted from hegemony. The U.S. worries about the rise of any hegemon who would challenge it and thus assumes that China may be the next challenger. Prof. Wait suggests that the U.S. should not make China feel the need to pursue hegemony. He argues that the chance for success is small, one out of four as history showed that France, Germany, and Japan all failed, only the U.S. succeeded with luck and her geopolitical advantages. China, not like the U.S., is surrounded by many neighbors, who, some with industrial power, would stop China from becoming a hegemon.
 
This author argues that the geopolitical advantage for the U.S. vanishes in the era of nuclear weapons. The U.S. cannot successfully maintain its hegemony strategy against China and a unipolar world. China is a great nation with a different geopolitical advantage for mutual trade and practicing its anti-hegemony strategy. (Its BRI program is a clear example.) China is big enough to be able to adequately defend itself with one-third or fewer nuclear weapons or military budgets than that of the U.S. (SCS stand-off is evidence.) So, using a hegemony strategy against China will not succeed. A more rational approach is to understand China’s anti-hegemony behavior and collaborate with China for a win-win outcome!
 


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